Perspectives (1969-1979)
Volume 2
Number 1 May

Article 3

1-1970

The Aim of Liberal Education
Henry H. Crimmel
St. Lawrence University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/perspectives
Part of the Higher Education Commons, and the Liberal Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Crimmel, Henry H. (1970) "The Aim of Liberal Education," Perspectives (1969-1979): Vol. 2 : No. 1 , Article
3.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/perspectives/vol2/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Western Michigan University at ScholarWorks at
WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Perspectives
(1969-1979) by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at
WMU. For more information, please contact wmuscholarworks@wmich.edu.

00

•Do
The Aim of Liberal Education
By

HENRY

H.

CRIMMEL

I. THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL EDUCATI ON AND A
PREREQUISITE FOR ITS RESOLUTI ON
Somewhat concealed by the more obvious problems of our time
are indications that the liberal arts tradition is in serious trouble.
Columbia University's Jacques Barzun, for example, has warned that
the liberal college now seems caught between the expansionist tendencies of the more sophisticated high schools and the pressure for specialization exerted by the affluent graduate schools. An editorial in the
Saturday Review not long ago reported that the percentage of students
enrolled in the small, private liberal colleges continues to decline year
after year and predicted that perhaps one-third (roughly 200) of these
colleges will not survive.
This situation is particularly disturbing in view of what has prevailed during much of the history of American education. In these
earlier times liberal (or general) education was respected as the ideal
form of education, a necessity for intellectual achievement, leadership,
and culture.
A prerequisite to any evaluation or resolution of this crisis is a
recognition of the distinctive character of a liberal education. Dr.
Earl J. McGrath, a former U.S. Commissioner for Education, has
repeatedly emphasized this need in arguing that many of the liberal
colleges today have "lost their sense of special purpose." 1 The argument that follows is an attempt to precisely and persuasively define this
special purpose. If successful, the argument will both refurbish a
1 Earl J. McGrath, The Graduate School .a nd the D ecline of Liberal Education (New York: Columbia University, 1959, p. 5.
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frequently forgotten ideal and demonstrate why liberal education 1s
a cause which imposes on us a preemptive obligation.
II. THE FAILURE OF CURRENT DEFINITIONS
Among the colleges which now claim to provide a liberal education,
many do not make a conscientious effort to define their educational
ideal. Typically a line or two dealing with the aim of the college is
inserted in the bulletins distributed to prospective students and parents
and usually at least a paragraph is included with poetical embellishments in the promotional and accreditational propaganda. Frequently,
however, these statements are unabashed window dressing. They give
the impression of lofty purposes, thereby appealing to idealistic students, parents, and foundations. But their lack of rigor is betrayed
by the glossy vagueness of the terms, the lack of internal consistency,
and the fact that they are ignored in educational decision-making.
Among the colleges which claim to provide a liberal education and
which make a conscientious effort to define their aim, the result is
generally limited to two equally sterile alternatives. In some cases a
definite but dogmatic formula is devised. Typically this is an attempt
to define the ideal by listing a number of character traits which supposedly identify the liberally educated man. While the precision of
this procedure is commendable, it is nonetheless open to criticism as
being dogmatic inasmuch as the traits enumerated depend upon the
preferences and prejudices of the group making the selection. In other
cases a less dogmatic but more amorphous formula is furnished. Usually
but unfortunately this attempt avoids criticism only by retreating to
bland generalities. While the undogmatic intent of this procedure is
admirable, it nonetheless fails as a definition because of its ambiguity.
These two alternatives have famil iar illustrations. Sometimes the
aim of liberal education is held to be the transmission of a certain
body of knowledge which all educated men are educated to possess.
This ideal of "common knowledge"2 is vulnerable to criticism, however, because men have been unable to agree for long on what constitutes "common knowledge"; and, if what constitutes it is taken on
the authority of an individual or a faculty, then there is clearly no
protection from the bias of that individual or faculty.
Often the ideal of "good citizenship"3 is adopted as a remedy for
2 This ideal is present in some of the "Great Books" programs.
3Perhaps the best known statement of this ideal is the Harvard "Redhook":
General Education in a Free Society: Report of the Harvard Committee
(Cambridge: Harvard University, 1945). While the committee cogently rejects
various unacceptable ideals, it stops short of a "unifying purpose" which is
undogmatic. Turning to "the character of American society" in order to
satisfy th e educational search for unity, it takes the needs of the democratic
state as its basic frame of reference. As much as we may be personally committed to d emocracy, to make liberal education subordinate to this political
ideal is to bind it dogmatica lly.
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the reputed "narrow intellectualism " of the ideal of "common knowledge." The recurring popularity of this ideal is evidenced by the
presently widespread opinion that the college should avoid isolation
and should put its resources a t the service of the local and national
communities and that its primary task is to t rain students to fulfill
the responsibilities of an adult life within these communities. However, since the definition of "good citizenship" depends upon the
definition of the good state a nd the good man, and since there is
scarcely unanimity on these fundamentals, the imposition of this ideal
results in a n education that produces only a pologists for the reigning
ideology. The ideal of "good citizenship" is therefore objectionably
dogmatic because it has the effect of committing educa tion to the
political ideals of a pa rticula r party or society.
Sometimes other idea ls are preferred because "common knowledge"
a nd "good ci tizenshi p" are though t to lack an essential spiritual or
cultural emphasis. For example, the ideal of religious faith, though
relatively out of favor today, has frequ ently been held in high esteem
in the past, as is evidenced by the original close rela tionship in this
country between the liberal college a nd denomina tional religion. Once
again, nevertheless, this concept is objectionable as being dogmatic
fo r the obvious reason tha t there is no universally accepted religious
faith.
When each of the a bove ideals is criticized, dogmatism is avoided
by sacrificing precision. For instance, occasionally it has been argued
tha t the aim of libera l edu cation is " the development of the intellect."4
This ideal seem s less pretentious than the ideal of "common knowledge" because it does not make a ny judgment about wha t every
liberally educated man should know. But the price of this modesty
is tha t wha t once was a definite formula tends now to become an
empty slogan. Attempts to specify the cha racter of the "developed intellect" seem only to reinstate the original dogmatism.

4A commendable a ttempt to specify this kind of ideal is made by P. L .
Dresse l and L . B. M ayhew in General Edu cation : Explorations in Evaluation:
The Final R eport of th e Cooperat ive S tudy of Evaluation in General Education
of th e America n Council on Edu catio n ( Washington : American Council on
Education , 1954) . In p roposing th a t "critical thinking" is th e " integrating
concept" for liberal education, an d in thus avoi ding a political bias, the Dresse l
R eport advances b eyond the Harvard "Redhook ." The a uthors, h owever, do
not specify the m eaning of "critical thinking" b ecause they h old th a t thi s is
still a m a ter for psychological resea rch . It is this suggestion ( tha t p erhaps
psychological investigations may be able to reveal th e charac teristics of "critical
thinking") that faults an otherwise sound argument. To put th e objection
briefly, the d etermination of the nature of "critica l thinking" is a normative ,
not a n empirical m a tter. H ence psychology is not qualified to make this
determination.
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The ideal of "excellence"5 seems for some to escape the objectionable bias of the ideal of "good citizenship." With this modification
it no longer appears mandatory to describe the character of the good
citizen or to accept a particular set of obligations as the moral law.
Again, however, the avoidance of dogmatism is achieved by retreating
from specificity. Hopefully "excellence" will characterize an'.)' enterprise; consequently without further specification it is a bare superlative,
unable to designate a form of education that is in any way distinctive.
The ideal of "morale"6 has recently been proposed as a replacement
for the ideal of a denominational religious faith. As a result, a declaration of belief in any particular religious creed is avoided . But if
the term "morale" is to descend from an ecumenical abstraction into
the world of concrete discourse, it must be given precision. Yet once
again it seems that any increase in precision will inevitably result in
the intensification of an objectionable bias.
The task of devising a definition that is both specific and undogmatic is admitted ly as difficult as it is desirable. Unless there is
specificity, no significant definition has been achieved; and, unless there
is freedom from dogma, the form of education defined will not, strictly
speaking, be education at all, but mere training, propagandizing, or
indoctrination.
III. THE AIM DEFINED FREE OF DOGMA
Obviously the expression "liberal education" has had a bewildering
variety of uses. For some it is the name of an institution that is in
conspiracy with "liberal" politicians to brainwash the young with
r:idical and un-American ideas. At the other extreme, and no less
prevalent and pernicious, is the view that it refers to an impractical,
dilettantish diddling with precepts and concepts characteristic of
aristocratic, reactionary civilizations. However, if my argument up to
this point is acceptable, it is because we are tacitly agreed that there is a
privileged use of the expression "liberal education" which refers to
an education that is free from commitment to any dogma, prejudice,
or mere opm1on.
Nevertheless, we must now wonder whether it is at all possible
to formulate a definition that is both unambiguous and undogmatic.
Apparently any definition will reflect some particular ideology or set
of values. Moreover, there appears today to be no single set of values
to which all men can subscribe. It is in fact characteristically modern
SThrough no fault of their own, except for their popularity, John Gardner's
Excellence (New York : H arper, 1961) and the "Rockefeller Report," The
Pursuit of Excellence: Education and the Future of America (New York:
Doubleday, 1958 ) have made this expression an irredeemable cliche.
6In "The N eed for Normative Unity in Higher Education" Mordecai M.
Kaplan argues that "morale," the specific concern of all religions, is essential
to genuine education. (Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and R. M. Maciver,
eds. Goals for American Education (New York: Harper, 1950).
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to admit that all truths are relative to points of view, all obligations
are relati\·e to societies, and all tastes are relative to the fashions of
the moment. In our pluralistic, skeptical age, consequently, it may seem
anachronistic and naive to hope for an ideal of education that is both
meaningful and more than the partisan of a particular ideology.
There is, however, a fatal inconsistency in any radical skepticism.
A skepticism must be discriminating. It cannot imply that all conclusions are mere dogmas or prejudices. On the contrary, if skepticism
itself is a justifiable conclusion, then it must at least have confidence
in that process which entitles it to be a justifiable conclusion. This
process-sometimes called criticism or dialectic-is a presupposition
of even the most nihilistic skepticism.
As the presupposition of skepticism, criticism is the logical process of justifying conclusions. Its ideal is the justification of all conclusions, whether these be factual claims made against truth or value
claims made against our obligations. The realization of this ideal would
indeed be knowledge in the most unqualified sense. Infrequently men
have not been embarrassed to seek such knowledge, and to speak of
it as "wisdom." Unlike those ideals which merely express subjective
preferences and prejudices, and which are defended only by ad hoc
maneuvers, an ideal which is the presupposition of skepticism is affirmed
even by all skeptical attempts to disaffirm it. As such, it has the unique
characteristic which was found lacking in the most popular definitions
of the aim of liberal education. An education which aims at wisdom,
which seeks the justification of all conclusions, is liberal in the privileged
sense tha t it is free from dogmatic commitment. Consequently, liberal
education can be defined undogmatically as the pursuit of wisdom.
IV. THE AIM SPECIFIED
It remains to be demonstrated that the proposed definition can
be gi\·en sufficient specificity to make it meaningful for educational
theory and practice. This demonstration can only turn upon the fact
that ,visdom is knowledge in the most unqualified sense, and the fact
that its essential feature is its freedom from dogma.
The dogmas tha t are the perennial obstacles to the pursuit of
wisdom di\'ide into two types according to whether they are theoretical,
and pertain to the achievement of knowledge, or practical, and pertain to the application of knowledge. The first is an assumption which
restricts knowledge to a given topic, model, or frame of reference. For
instance, it has variously been assumed that the paradigm of knowledge
is kno\\'ledge of the physical universe, or the moral law, or transcendent
reality. Such knowledge is achieved on the basis of an assumption about
the appropriate object of knowledge, however, and is, therefore, hypothetical or specialized, not comprehensive. Wisdom, in contrast, is
comprehensive in the sense that it exempts no assumption from critical
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examination. This insistence upon comprehensiveness does not support the absurd view tha t the wise man knows everything, nor the
equally ridiculous view that he ignores facts in a flight to abstractions;
it merely entails tha t no man knows a nything as long as he is ignorant
of those prec:uppositions which limit his own point of view and that
true comprehension ( as is suggested by etymology) requires comprehensiveness.
The second type of dogma a nd obstacle to the pursuit of wisdom
is an imposed purpose, the demand that knowledge be useful for some
preordained end. For example, it has variously been held tha t knowledge is essentially a means for individual self-fulfillment, or an instrument for social reform, or a path to religious enlightenment. Such
knowledge, however, h as been subordinated to a specific application
and consequently is applied or technological, not pure. In contrast,
wisdom is knowledge that is pure or " useless" in the sense that it is
not sought as a means to any end. This emphasis upon purity gives no
support to the weird view that the wise man disdains labor, nor to the
equally silly notion that he spends his life just sitting and contemplating
his navel ; it merely recognizes tha t if knowledge is to be free from
dogma, it must be an end (or ideal), not a means, that all activity is
"sound and fury, signi fying nothing" unless it is subordinated to an
ideal, and that ( contrary to the propaganda of tyranny ) wha t is best
cannot be what is useful.
Since wisdom is knowledge free from ungrounded assumptions and
imposed purposes, liberal education, the pursuit of wisdom, must avoid
specialization an d technology and aspire to comprehensiveness and
purity. As a result, it is unique among the enterprises of m an because
of its absolute independence: it cannot be justified b y other endeavors,
whereas all other endeavors require justifica tion by it. It is, to adopt
a contemporary idiom, the resolute concern for justified thought a nd
action. 7 Hopefully this concern will be engendered by the integrated
educational p rogram of the liberal college. If successful, it becomes an
obsession which identifies a human being and which is the precondition for a meaningful life.
There is a recurrently popular epistemology tha t identifies knowledge with informa tion. According to this theory, knowledge can be

7There are different ways of summarizing this crucia l p oi nt. For instance,
for Plato it is "self-knowledge," while for Aristotle it is "wisdom." For Heid egger it is th e exis tential point tha t "meditative thinking" makes possible
"releasement toward things" a nd "openness to th e mystery" (M . Heidegger,
Discourse on Thinkin g, N ew York: H a rper a nd R ow, 1966 ), while for R . S.
Peters it is a linguistic point: "People . . . think that education must be for
the sake of something ex trinsic that is worthwhile, whereas th e truth is tha t
!being worthwhile is p art of what is meant by calling it 'education.' " (R . D.
Archambault, ed., Ph iloso phical Analysis and Education, New York : Humanities Press, 1965, p. 92 .)
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collected, processed, and preserved in books or punch cards in libraries
or bomb-proof vaults. The problem of education then becomes the
problem of efficiently transmitting these sacred nuggets to successive
generations and the college is understood as an assembly line in which
students are stuffed with the maximum amount of information in the
minimum amount of time.
The definition of liberal education as the resolute concern for
justified thought and action emphasizes the superficiality of any theory
that identifies knowledge with information. If thought and action are
to be justified, then obviously all conclusions, whether they be claims
to truth or value, stand in need of justifications, or principles. In addition, conclusions require methods for their establishment and justification. Consequently, liberal education is not simply a concern for
conclusions ( the results of information provided by the various sciences) , but it is necessa rily also a concern for methods and principles.
Conclusions are the contribution of the liberal sciences; methods are the
affair of the liberal arts; and principles are the responsibility of
philosophy.

V. THE FIRST DIMENSION: THE LIBERAL SCIENCES
A liberal education can only begin in medias res with the accepted
conclusions of the liberal sciences. These sciences are those that are
relatively comprehensive and pure.
The need for comprehensiveness implies that the sciences and
conclusions that are more universal in scope be given priority over
those tha t are more limited. The present tendency in liberal curricula
to substitute specialized theoretical or applied sciences for a comprehensive trea tment of science and the tendency to support this substitution on the ground tha t comprehensiveness is tantamount to superficiality can be defended solely on the basis of the theory which is selfdefeating because it aspires to comprehensiveness while depreciating it.
In particular, the exclusion of the practical sciences ( ethics and politics)
is not just theoretically arbitrary, but from the standpoint of liberal
education scandalous. Wha t is being excluded as irrelevant are the
proposed answers to those fundamental questions about the good life
and the good society which originally impel men to seek a liberal education. This bias against the practical sciences also degrades the poetical
sciences. Its results can be seen in the not uncommon views that ethics
is largely a m atter of ministers and mores, and that aesthetics is mostly
a diversion for intellectually oriented esthetes. In addition, the preferen ce for specialization over generalization within the theoretical
sciences reverses the essential direction of the scientific enterprise, the
movement from particularity to universality. The result of this prejudice against comprehensiveness is exemplified by the scientist whose
achievements are compromised by his myopic inability to depart from
15

the methodological conventions of his own specialty, as well as by his
blindness to the ethical and aesthetical consequences of his work.
The need for purity requires that the sciences and conclusions which
are sought for their own sake be valued over those which are treated
as means to some end. The present tendency in liberal curricula to
emphasize the applied sciences, and to deprecate the pure sciences as
vestiges of an ivory-towerism which inhibits progress, can be defended
only on the basis of a theory which is self-defeating because it depreciates theory. In an education whose goal is wisdom it is imperative
that the application of knowledge always be secondary to the achievement of knowledge. In this situation the impediments to progress are
not the speculations of pure science but the glamour and gimmickry
of technology.
The proliferation of the specialized and applied sciences in the
liberal college is a symptom of the precarious condition of liberal education. The college now rationalizes this proliferation in the name of
freedom by means of the so-called "elective principle." The syndrome
which is concealed by this euphemism for the loss of institutional
identity is recognized by an unstructured "cafeteria" curriculum which
levels-down all subjects to equal relevance ( and irrelevance ) by the
perpetual fragmentation of knowledge, by the curricular emphasis
upon the "interesting" and the "timely" rather than the demanding
and the timeless, by the increasing departmentaliza tion and isolation
of the faculty, by the tendency to treat all students as "majors" and
to encourage premature research, by the teacher's embarrassment at
being a teacher ( rather than a research scholar) , and by the college's
embarrassment at being a college (rather than a university or graduate school ) . What has been too frequently forgotten is the radical
disparity between liberal education and all other forms of education.
As Robert M. Hutchins has so forcefully reminded us, liberal education, not specialization and technology, is the highest achievement of
both education and life. The liberal college is not a prep school for
graduate study; it has a more urgent, intrinsically valuable aim.

VI. THE SECOND DIMENSION: THE LIBERAL ARTS
The establishment and justification of the conclusions of liberal
sciences obviously require certain methods, disciplines, skills, or arts.
If the liberal sciences provide theoretical, practical, and poetical conclusions, then the liberal arts are those methods required by the sciences for thinking, doing, and making. Consequently the generic liberal
arts are the arts of critical thinking, rational action, and aesthetic
creation and appreciation. Without these arts intelligence, character,
and culture are unrealizable, and wisdom remains an idea beyond
human aspiration.
The need for the liberal arts as a second dimension of liberal
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education entails that those arts whose application is limited or
subservient to personal or social ends be displaced in favor of the
arts of critical thinking, rational action, and aesthetic creation and
appreciation. In our liberal colleges today it is not unusual to find
courses in various specialized and vocational or applied arts. But it is
unusual to find curricula in which the acquisition of information is
effectively complemented by a program of teaching and training designed to develop the arts of wisdom. Too often, for instance, there
is little systematic concern with the diverse strategies and skills of
scientific investiga tion; too often logic and mathematics are treated
as options for those students who happen to be "analytically" inclined; and too frequently these same subjects are taught as specialized
sciences and not as universal arts. The practical and poetical arts
fare even worse than the theoretical arts. The arts of rational action,
for instance, are generally regarded as personal or religious matters, and
therefore beyond the legitimate scope of the curriculum. The only surviving vestige of the once-honored poetical arts to be considered
essential in the curriculum is English composition. Rhetoric, once a
member of the trivium, is now often viewed as trivial. The arts of
literary interpretation and criticism, like those skills required for appreciation and creation in the fine arts, are typically tolerated as
electives for those who happen to be "artistically" inclined. The result
of this widespread neglect of the liberal arts is that the student, denied
systematic training in these uniquely human skills, eventually seeks a
surrogate outside the curriculum. There, in a jungle of largely anticurricular "ext ra-curricular" activities, his energies a re dissipated and
the community is entertained, but his talents remain undisciplined and
undeveloped.
The expression "liberal arts" has today degenerated to mean little
more than a random collection of advanced high school studies, few
of which are in any sense arts. Moreover, these studies are often not
part and parcel of a comprehensive program of liberal education; they
are sold piecemeal as unrelated courses and are normally remedial and
preprofessional in their conception. The unfortunate and p aradoxical
truth is that, in spite of their name, our liberal arts colleges are no
longer dedicated to the liberal arts.
VII. THE THIRD DIMENSION: PHILOSOPHY
The escape from dogma and the achievement of wisdom require
that conclusions be justified by methods in principles. Liberal education,
therefore, requires not only the liberal sciences and arts but also
philosophy. As the concern with the ultimate justifications of thought
and action, philosophy is neither a science nor an art, neither a body
of information nor a repertory of methods. But while philosophy is
distinct from both science and art, it is also inseparable from them.
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Without them, it justifies nothing; and yet without it, nothing is
justified. Philosophy is thus the indispensable third dimension of liberal
education.
While the current crisis of liberal education can be attributed in
pa rt to the erosion of the comprehensiveness and purity of the sciences a nd in part to the neglect of the liberal a rts, the crisis must also
be a ttributed in part to the deprecia tion of philosophy. The present
clima te of educational opinion has largely collapsed the three dimensions of liberal education into a fragmented single dimension- to the
collection of the conclusions of a few fashionable theoretical sciences
and a few profitable applied sciences. In the frantic effort to engorge the
student with this informa tion, philosophy eventual ly becomes a superfluous curiosity. If it is forced to pose as a science, then, because its
conclusions will be comic fare in competition with the conclusions of
the genuine sciences, its fate is to be tolera ted as a kind of museum
for dead ideas. On the other hand, if it is forced to pose as an a rt, and
is demoted to tha t motley, academic catch-all category, " the humanities," then it m ay gain a grudging acceptance as a kind of psychic or
semantic therapy which is absorbing and beneficial for certain nervous
cerebral types. The unfortuna te a nd paradoxical truth is that, in spite
of the etymology of its name, philosophy is seldom considered essential
to liberal education.

VIII. THE IRONY IN THE PRESENT CRISIS
As strange as it may seem, the liberal college's current failure to
m aintain the comprehensiveness a nd purity of the sciences, its aversion
to the liberal arts, a nd its deprecia tion of philosophy m ay conceivably be due in la rge pa rt to an underlying fear of dogmatism. Colleges
are typically reluctant to distinguish between sciences that are relevant
and those that a re irrelevant to the curriculum ( on the ground tha t
such structuring involves bias) . They are suspicious of the arts ( on
the ground tha t arts require training, and training requires coercion).
And they are distrustful of philosophy ( on the ground tha t philosophy
poses as a science but lacks scientific objectivity ) .
If it is indeed true that the fear of dogmatism is a decisive factor
in the present crisis of liberal education, then the situation is tragically
ironic. The concern with the liberal sciences, the liberal arts, and
philosophy was originally required by the need to escape dogma. To
replace this concern only with the accumulation of informa tion is not
to avoid dogmatism ; it is, on the contrary, to engage in a more surreptitious and insidious form of dogmatism, one that remains hidden
because it is a bias in the found a tions of educational and epistemological
theory. The escape from dogma and the approxima tion of wisdom
demand the intense cultivation of each dimension of liberal education.
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IX. THE PRE-EMPTIVE CLAIM OF LIBERAL EDUCATION
Certainly the a rgument presented here is nothing new. It has been
sta ted m any times a nd in many different ways since a ntiquity. Yet,
because it is a n a rgument tha t seeks both to inform us a nd to reform
us, it requires repetition and reformul a tion. The aim of liberal education is (in a very specific sense ) wisdom ; and wisdom is a responsibility
tha t must pre-empt all other responsibilities. If m en lose this insight
or abandon this cause, then all of the vaunted ca uses of our d ay a re
conceived in ignorance, presumptuous in their claim to obligation,
a nd unworthy of passion.
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